The market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent. -- John Maynard Keynes
Friday, July 20, 2012
Will Operation Twist "Destroy Credit Creation"?
By John Mason Sep 8, 2011, 9:46 AM Author's Website
Yesterday I discussed the concern Bill Gross, founder and co-chief investment officer of PIMCO, has about the current Federal Reserve policy of keeping short-term interest rates low for the next two years. The concern extends to the possibility that the Fed will attempt to “twist” the term structure of interest rates by buying more and more long-term government securities in an attempt to bring longer-term interest rates in line with the very low short-term interest rates. Gross sees the efforts extending to the seven- and eight-year maturity range.
The concern Gross has is that a flat yield curve will cause banks and other financial organizations to de-leverage even further and faster than they would under conditions the of un-sustainable debt levels created by the previous fifty years of credit inflation. Gross, in his Financial Times article, argued that the Federal Reserve consistently maintained a positive slope to the yield curve throughout this fifty year period (with the exception of periods of tight monetary policy) so that the banks and other financial institutions would continually provide “credit creation” so that the economy would continue to expand and create jobs.
The positive slope to the yield curve provided the mechanism for this credit creation through three channels that I have written about on a regular basis. First, the positive slope to the yield curve meant that banks and other financial institutions could borrow short at relatively low interest rates and lend long at higher interest rates. The mis-matching of maturities increases interest-rate risk but then if the yield curve, on average, remains positive, the positive yield spread can be maintained over time.
Second, credit inflation “bails out” riskier loans so the banks and other financial institutions could lend money on riskier deals and thereby earn an even larger interest rate margin. To paraphrase Warren Buffet…if credit inflation tide is rising, it is hard to tell bad assets from good assets. Only when the credit inflation tide recedes and the water level drops do we discover who is not wearing a bathing suit. Tell me about the sub-prime mortgage mess…
Third, narrow interest margins can be turned into substantial returns on equity by the use of financial leverage. And, if competition brings net interest margin levels down, banks and other financial institutions can maintain the levels of return on equity they had previously earned by adding more and more financial leverage to their balance sheets.
This third component of the growing risk exposure of a period of credit inflation can only succeed if the banks and other financial institutions are “liability managers”. In terms of the last fifty years, financial institutions became liability managers through the process of financial innovation. Most financial institutions were locked into their balance sheets before the 1960s because money and capital markets were not developed to the extent that banks and others could buy or sell all the funds they wanted a the going market interest rate.
Commercial banks, at this earlier time, could only obtain funds through “local” markets and these funds were not very interest sensitive. Hence, these organizations were “asset managers” limited to what Leo Tilman calls “Balance Sheet Arbitrage”. (See a review of Tilman’s book “Financial Darwinism”). Balance sheet arbitrage is the “old” way of commercial banking where banks are “local” in nature and obtain funds from demand deposit accounts and savings accounts which pay very low interest rates and lend the funds out to borrowers, many of whom have no other sources of funding so that the interest on these loans are relatively high. Thus, the banks worked with nice interest margins that were relatively stable and reliable.
Liability management came into pay through the financial innovation of the 1960s. Negotiable CDs and Eurodollar deposit along with holding company issue Bankers Acceptances became the innovation of choice in the larger banks and this freed up the balance sheets of banks so that they were no longer limited to “local” constraints on the choice of funding sources. Funding sources became world wide and the understanding was that, at most times, banks could now buy or sell as many funds as they wanted at the going market interest rate.
In essence, commercial banks could now “leverage up” as much as regulation…or accounting rules…would allow!
And, as regulation eased up, banks and other financial institutions got into other financial and organizational innovations. Tilman lists these as moves into “Principal Investments” (private equity and venture capital, investments in hedge funds, or, capital allocations to internal proprietary trading desks) and “Systematic Risks” (which included interest rate risks, credit risks, currencies, commodities, and equity indices). This created an environment I have called the “New Liquidity.”
The result? Bill Gross nails it in his article: “Thousands of billions of dollars were extended…” It seems as if capital requirements were non-existent. Credit could expand almost without limit.
And, why are we interested in credit inflation and not price inflation? Why do we focus on credit creation and not money? Focus, in the past, was placed on money because people were concerned about what was happening with consumer prices…”flow” prices. “Flow” prices relate to the prices paid for goods and services that are consumed in a relatively short period of time. “Flow” prices are to be differentiated from “asset” prices.
“Flow” prices are in many ways “constructed” prices. For example, in the construction of the Consumer Price Index, the price of a house is not included because that is the price of an asset. The “flow” of housing services is what people consume and the “price” of this flow of services is called “rent”. In the construction of the CPI, the “rental price” of housing services is, to a large extent, estimated. And, as it turns out, since the consumption of housing services is such a large component of consumer expenditures, the “rent” component turns out to be the largest part of the CPI.
Theoretically, the price of an ‘asset” (the price of a house) should be equal to the discounted present value of the future cash flows relating to the purchase of the housing services provided by the house (the rent or rental value of the housing services). In the world these two prices can differ from one another for a substantial amount of time as they did during the 2000s where housing prices were severely inflated and estimates of rental values lagged far behind.
This is true of other asset categories like equity shares that are traded on the stock markets (take for example the Internet bubble of the 1990s).
Thus credit and credit inflation are of crucial interest to the behavior of prices…all prices…in the economy. And this is why we must be interested in cumulative credit inflations that become unsustainable and turn into cumulative debt deflations that create a “formidable headwind” (thank you Mr. Bernanke) that must be overcome by any fiscal or monetary policy hoping to stimulate growth in the economy.
The problem seen by Mr. Gross, however, is that the monetary policy now being followed by the Mr. Bernanke and the Federal Reserve that promotes a flat yield curve will just exacerbate the situation because it will accelerate the debt deflation taking place. One could also argue (ala Mr. Gross) that the situation created by recent financial innovation, the “new liquidity”, will further add to the volatility of the whole situation.
Wednesday, July 18, 2012
Pick Your Debt Poison
When it comes to estimating the biggest threat to the global financial system, by far the biggest threat and biggest unknown is the total Financial debt in the system, for the simple reason that as we have been showing for over two years, it is simply impossible to quantify just what the real level of such debt in the developed world truly is, especially when one accounts for shadow liabilities, rehypothecated collateral, derivatives, and all those other footnotes in financial statements that only become relevant when daisy-chained collateral links start collapsing following the default of one or more financial entities, and when gross becomes net. What we can, however, do is show the other three major categories of debt currently existing in the system: Government, Corporate and Household debt, as they are distributed among the "developed" countries. We also know what the tresholds are beyond which the debt becomes unsustainable. In the words of the BIS: "For government debt, the threshold is around 85% of GDP... When corporate debt goes beyond 90% of GDP, it becomes a drag on growth. And for household debt, we report a threshold around 85% of GDP, although the impact is very imprecisely estimated."
So in light of all these various thresholds, where do the "developed countries" of the world stack up? It's not pretty.
Total Government Debt distribution:
Total Corporate Debt distribution:
Total Household Debt distribution:
And one final chart showing all three non-financial debt categories combined. We leave conclusions to the reader.
Source: Metis Risk Consulting, Feasta
Tuesday, July 17, 2012
IHH Healthcare IPO Oversubscribed by 5.45 times
IHH Healthcare Berhad Initial Public Offering (IPO) received an overwhelming response with its public portion of 161.14 million shares. It was oversubscribed by 5.45 times. The IPO attract 65,834 applications or 1.04 billion shares.
The Institutional Price was fixed at RM2.80 per Offer Share. Accordingly, the Final IPO Price for the Retail Offering is fixed at RM2.80 per Offer Share. The difference of RM0.05 per IPO Share will be despatched to successful retail applicants within 10 market days from 16 July 2012.
The IPO allocate 208.51 million shares for public. Of these, 80.57 million shares were allocated for Bumiputera category while 80.57 million shares were allocated for Malaysian Public category.
Below are the allotment summary for public portion.
Allotment summary for Bumiputera portion
| Denomination | No of Application | No of Successful Application | % Chance | Share / Successful Applications | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| From | to | ||||
| 100 | 200 | 105 | 21 | 20.00 | 100 |
| 300 | 900 | 162 | 46 | 28.40 | 300 |
| 1,000 | 1,900 | 2,590 | 1,301 | 50.23 | 1,000 |
| 2,000 | 2,900 | 1,476 | 760 | 51.49 | 2,000 |
| 3,000 | 3,900 | 1,278 | 670 | 52.43 | 3,000 |
| 4,000 | 5,900 | 2,096 | 1,130 | 53.91 | 4,000 |
| 6,000 | 10,900 | 3,556 | 1,950 | 54.84 | 6,000 |
| 11,000 | 19,900 | 2,481 | 1,380 | 55.62 | 9,000 |
| 20,000 | 49,900 | 3,490 | 1,960 | 56.16 | 14,000 |
| 50,000 | 99,900 | 896 | 515 | 57.48 | 20,000 |
| 100,000 | 199,900 | 462 | 285 | 61.69 | 22,000 |
| 200,000 | 499,900 | 138 | 98 | 71.01 | 24,000 |
| 500,000 | 999,900 | 23 | 17 | 73.91 | 26,000 |
| 1,000,000 | ABOVE | 10 | 10 | 100 | 28,000 |
| 18,763 | 10,143 | ||||
Allotment summary for Public portion
| Denomination | No of Application | No of Successful Application | % Chance | Share / Successful Applications | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| From | to | ||||
| 100 | 200 | 181 | 21 | 11.60 | 100 |
| 300 | 900 | 390 | 46 | 11.79 | 300 |
| 1,000 | 1,900 | 7,497 | 1,124 | 14.99 | 1,000 |
| 2,000 | 2,900 | 4,903 | 750 | 15.30 | 2,000 |
| 3,000 | 3,900 | 4,111 | 660 | 16.05 | 3,000 |
| 4,000 | 5,900 | 5,373 | 916 | 17.05 | 4,000 |
| 6,000 | 10,900 | 9,623 | 1,735 | 18.03 | 6,000 |
| 11,000 | 19,900 | 9,547 | 1,815 | 19.01 | 9,000 |
| 20,000 | 49,900 | 9,481 | 1,896 | 20.00 | 14,000 |
| 50,000 | 99,900 | 2,546 | 535 | 21.01 | 20,000 |
| 100,000 | 199,900 | 1,172 | 258 | 22.01 | 22,000 |
| 200,000 | 499,900 | 242 | 58 | 23.97 | 24,000 |
| 500,000 | 999,900 | 44 | 15 | 34.09 | 26,000 |
| 1,000,000 | ABOVE | 60 | 30 | 50.00 | 28,000 |
| 55,170 | 9,859 | ||||
Notices of Allotment will be dispatched by post to all successful applicants on or before 24th July 2012. IHH Healthcare is expected to be listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia on 25th July 2012 under stock name “IHH”.
Monday, July 16, 2012
Japan’s Demographic Trap
Japan recently surpassed a dubious milestone when the country’s total debt officially topped the one quadrillion yen ($14 trillion) mark. Expressed as a percentage of the country’s Gross Domestic Product, Japan’s total debt exceeds 225 percent of the country’s GDP, and with the exception of only Italy, Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio is now more than twice that of any other G7 country.
Despite having one of the world’s highest debt ratios, Japan’s debt remains in demand even though yields on Japanese bonds are at their lowest in nearly two years. The yen too continues to appreciate in spite of efforts by the Bank of Japan to weaken the currency.
Considering how yields have ballooned for the more indebted of the Eurozone countries, it may appear that Japan is not being held to the same standard by the investing community. Greece was forced to work out a deal with its creditors to avoid a default and bond yields for several countries, including Spain, have risen sharply and are nearing levels many consider to be unsustainable. Meanwhile, Japan has no trouble finding buyers for 2-year bonds offering a measly 0.11 percent; given all that we have witnessed in Europe, it seems counter-intuitive that Japan’s bond sales and currency should remain so robust.
However, there is a fundamental difference between Japan and Europe; in Japan, the vast majority of the debt is actually held by, and continues to be snapped up by, Japanese institutions and the people of Japan themselves. Very little – relatively speaking – of Japan’s debt is held by foreign interests.
Unfortunately, while keeping most of the country’s debt within its own borders may avoid issues similar to those facing the Eurozone, this arrangement is not without concern. Japan is coping with negative population growth and this means that as Japan’s soon-to-be retiring workers leave the workplace, the number of younger workers to replace the retirees are too few in number to support current growth levels. This alarming situation puts the long-term sustainability of the economy at peril. As we shall discuss later on, the demographics that have for so long worked to Japan’s advantage, will soon align against the country’s best interests.
Japan: A Nation of Savers
A 2009 breakdown of Japan’s debt placed foreign ownership at just slightly over 5 percent. Clearly, Japan’s reputation as a nation of savers is well-earned. However, in this case, the diligence exercised by the people of Japan to build their savings has had unintended consequences on the yen.
Because the lion’s share of Japan’s debt is held by the people of Japan, and because they continue to eagerly purchase new bond issues, the yen is considered well-supported. This, together with Japan’s historically strong export sales has contributed to the yen’s track record of consistent exchange rate gains. It is this track record that has led to the yen being considered a “safe haven” destination.
Adding to the yen’s appeal as a safe haven currency is the expectation that Japan’s inflation rate will remain stable for the near-term at least. This reduces the likelihood of future buying power being eroded by an unexpected rise in inflation and these are the factors investors look for when seeking to shelter assets during times of market turmoil. While there may be better choices for speculative exchange rate gains, there are few other currencies offering the degree of stability the yen represents, and with the growing uncertainty in Europe, the amount of money “parked” in the yen is likely to rise.
While the yen bulls and those seeking shelter from market volatility may welcome the yen’s persistent appreciation, the Bank of Japan does not share the same enthusiasm. The modern form of Japan’s economy was built largely on exports taking advantage of a cheap labor force and low manufacturing costs as the country entered a rebuilding phase following the end of the war in 1945.
Nearly seventy years later, Japan’s export industry remains a key part of its economy but with global consumer demand still well below pre-recession levels, Japan has suffered a decline in sales as importing economies struggle to find their feet. Even internal factors including last year’s earthquake and a general slowdown in productivity have conspired to send Japan’s balance of trade into a rare deficit situation.
Of course, it is not only a stronger yen that has hurt Japan’s export sales. Japan is also forced to import its oil and rising energy costs have further eroded Japan’s ability to compete. Japan’s well-documented problems with its nuclear energy program will force Japan to continue its reliance on costly forcing energy to power its industries. For a country that counts so heavily on exports, this is a dangerous turn of events and authorities have come under increasing pressure to ease the yen’s rate of appreciation to make Japan’s exports more competitive.
Bank of Japan Intervenes
When Central Banks determine that weakening the currency would be advantageous for the economy, the first course of action tends to be a reduction in interest rates. The resulting lower yield on deposits simultaneously reduces demand for the currency which can – potentially – lead to a decrease in the exchange rate for the currency. For exporting nations, a weaker currency can boost export sales as the reduced exchange rate helps make exports more affordable for foreign buyers.
Previous attempts by the Central Bank to slow the yen’s ascent has already resulted in slashing interest rates to just 0.05 percent. With rates practically at zero already, there is no further benefit available from an interest rate adjustment and the Bank can dispense with any hope that other Central Banks will act to strengthen their respective currencies. The European Central Bank is facing the prospect of a possible recession in several Eurozone countries and this essentially nullifies the likelihood of an interest rate hike at this time.
Likewise, the U.S. economy is recovering at a painfully slow rate and the Federal Reserve has taken every opportunity of late to reconfirm its pledge to hold interest rates at 0.25 percent at least until the middle of 2014. This leaves the authorities in Japan no alternative but to resort to direct market intervention to ease monetary policy.
Resigned to the fact that market intervention is the only viable option still available for weakening the yen, Japan initiated a series of actions last year to release trillions of yen into the economy. The Bank has continued these efforts into the new year and since the beginning of 2012, authorities have made an additional 20 trillion yen available to the banking system. This includes a 10 trillion yen infusion in February, followed by an additional 10 trillion yen in April.
While the actions slowed the yen’s appreciation – even reversing it following the February event – the impact was hardly long-lasting. Looking at a chart tracking the exchange rate history, from February until early March, the yen did indeed weaken with the dollar rising from a low of just over 76 yen to the dollar to nearly 84 yen to the dollar:
US Dollar / Yen Comparison
However, since then, the dollar has continued to fall and as of the first week of May, has retraced to about 80 yen to the dollar. This has increased pressure on Japanese currency officials to take more decisive action to protect exports as the yen once again closes in on 82 yen to the dollar. Last year, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku referred to this level as the “line of defense to prevent currency strength from harming the economy”.
Given that statement, and seeing that, presently, one U.S. dollar has fallen back to about 80 yen, most expect further intervention is inevitable.
Nevertheless, on May 1st, Takehiko Nakao, vice finance minister for international affairs, opted to suspend the release of more money to the system but did signal that further easing efforts remain under consideration.
“We are concerned about the somewhat rapid appreciation of the yen since the end of last week,” noted Nakao. “We will continue to closely monitor the market with caution so that we can act in a timely, appropriate manner when needed.”
Japan’s Demographic Trap
While officials grapple with what seems to be a currency that simply does not react to the laws of economics, there is one law that even the yen will be powerless to resist – the law of nature. Japan’s population as a whole is growing older and the demographics point to a future where retirees outnumber workers, and to a time when the country’s famous savings will be whittled down to next to nothing.
Japan’s aging populace is the result of declining birth rates and exceptionally low immigration. According to a 2009 United Nations report, Japan was the oldest society on the planet with a median age of 44 years.
The outlook is expected to worsen as the country’s death rate now exceeds the birth rate indicating the average age will only continue to rise. Naturally, as more of Japan’s citizens reach their retirement years, they will start to withdraw money from their savings thereby reducing the pool of savings, eventually resulting in a near-total drawdown on these funds.
The county’s growing legion of retirees will also have little need to add to their savings and this could prove the event that forces Japan to turn to outside investors to bridge the growing deficit. Unlike most of those now buying Japan’s debt, these new investors will not be purchasing Japan’s bonds for patriotic reasons – they will be looking for speculative gains, and in order to attract new investors, yields will unquestionably be forced higher. Considerably higher, in fact, and given the current debt-to-GDP ratio, and a structural annual budget deficit expected to top 15 trillion yen by 2015, investors may feel the new Japan represents too great a risk.
With Japan’s population aging at an accelerated pace, and with the coming generations insufficient in number to fill the thinning ranks, the long-term sustainability of the economy is at risk. This is the demographic trap that is poised to spring shut.
Is Keynesianism Running Dry?
Why policymakers must be brave and innovate with economic policy
Even though the policy mix is extraordinarily stimulating, developed-world economies just cannot embark on a virtuous circle of recovery. Worse still, governments, whose finances have been bled dry, are powerless to boost demand. This all suggests Keynesian policies have failed. A fresh approach to economic policy is needed. But policymakers will need to be both bold and brave.
The current state of economies is serious and worrying: although deliberate expansionary policies have been pragmatically implemented since March 2009, governments and central banks throughout the developed world have been unable to push recalcitrant economies back into the virtuous loop of self-sustaining recovery. The implications are plain for all to see: once governments apply a brake to public spending, growth slows considerably. Economies of the developed world have become addicts, ‘hooked’ on government spending.
The annualised rate of US economic growth has slackened to no more than 2%, down from 6% in Q2 2009, in spite of the mix of reflationary fiscal policies and the US Federal Reserve’s unprecedented quantitative easing. Europe’s economies are heading for recession, crippled by draconian budget austerity in many countries intended to redress astronomical public-sector deficits and national debt. Worst-case scenarios are pointing to Europe’s GDP shrinking by 2% over the coming 12 to 18 months. This calamitous failure of economic policies will have serious social, political and, self-evidently, economic repercussions.
Keynesianism running dry
Both US and European economies see jobs being destroyed once growth slows below 2%. If recession bites, obviously jobs are wiped out on a more massive scale and household income shrinks. Unemployment and contracting income penalise social well-being in developed nations: the number of people living below the poverty line is rising non-stop. Although this stratum of society was considered just a marginal fringe twenty years ago, it now accounts for between 10% and 20% of the total population in most developed economies (15% in the US, 12% in France, 21% in the UK).
Draconian austerity measures in a setting of lacklustre growth make a recipe for despair in the population, creating a breeding-ground for ever more popular extremist political parties. Recent general elections in Greece, France, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden have seen farright populist and parties disturbingly making electoral breakthroughs or scoring big gains. Modern societies can no longer promise future generations a better, brighter future. Political instability precludes the vital nationwide consensus being formed to push through measures required to rebuild the foundations of a solid economy.
This economic-policy stalemate, in particular, is becoming increasingly blatant. Traditional Keynesian remedies are proving both unworkable and ineffectual. Record public deficits of 10% of GDP in 2009, inflated by the host of budget reflationary programmes, have resulted in governments being either de facto or potentially insolvent. Since then, with no financial ammunition left, governments have been unable to push through any further reflationary measures and compensate for the drop in wages by distributing increased social-welfare benefits. Worse still, by slashing public spending, a strategy regarded by economists as essential to restore countries’ sustainable financial viability, policymakers are making matters worse: as growth slows, deficit-cutting targets are being missed and the trajectory on public debt is moving ever further away from its optimal pathway. With no credit to dispense, State-administered Keynesianism is, in effect, bankrupt as government spending levers can no longer be activated.
A new role for government needs to be envisaged
How serious have things become?
After all, Keynesianism’s limitations have been apparent for some time. By seeking to kick-start growth by boosting consumer spending, it has become clear that modern economies no longer rely on consumption. To be more precise, the dynamics of virtuous, self-sustaining economic growth are not triggered by consumer spending. In contrast, the dynamics feed through eventually into consumption – they are instigated by investment and, by extension, jobs. This key focus on the investment/employment duo has been noticeably lacking in the US and European economic policy mix over the last four years. The time has come to review the role government and the State, shown now to be effectively toothless, play in influencing economic growth.
As governments alone are no longer able to spend and stimulate growth, they need to turn towards encouraging spending by other economic players, especially those who can intervene effectively to boost jobs and incomes, i.e. businesses. To do that though, politicians will need to be both bold and brave. At a time when capitalism is being accused of the most reprehensible wrongdoings, policymakers will need to display great courage to promote the virtues of entrepreneurship and business. However, while Keynesianism may be looking bankrupt, demand-side economic policies are looking dead in the water as well. As a result, moving to economics geared to boosting supply is absolutely indispensible. The rub is that the policies for this still have to be invented.
There has, however, been one illustrious precedent: the supply-side economies implemented with success by the Reagan Administration in the early 1980s, followed by twenty-five years of sustained growth in a period referred to as the era of the ‘Great Moderation’. The fresh approach to economic policy now will need to be generous in seeking to promote innovation. Investment and job creation tend not to happen without a major wave of innovation. Of course, innovation cannot be decreed into existence. But it can be nurtured through fiscal incentives that favour risk-taking. Huge tax breaks for R&D and capital spending would be likely to form the major building-blocks of any future budget policy to stimulate supply. Making such moves would call for great political courage as, nowadays, it is regarded as socially equitable and electorally advantageous to tax – even so heavily as to veer close to financial repression – those generators of wealth most liable to be most useful in boosting supply.
A fresh approach to economic policy
There is a second challenge though.
Unchecked, supply-driven economic policies tend to lead to excess. Modern economic history covering the Great Moderation period has demonstrated that overgenerous use of credit always ends in tears. First of all, in the 1990s, the belief that boom-and-bust cycles were things of the past thanks to the advent of revolutionary new information and communications technologies lured companies into running up huge borrowings beyond what their returns on equities could withstand. This sparked the bursting of the dot.com bubble and TMT (technology, media, telecom) crash. Then, from the early 2000s, it was households’ turn to overstretch themselves with debt, culminating in the sub-prime crisis. Moreover, innovation per se should not be regarded as universally wonderful. Just take the example of financial innovation which, unregulated, lay behind the ballooning debt.
Excess lending will inevitably lead to artificially-driven economic growth as it breaks the link between the cycles of innovation and economic growth. The virtuous qualities of real economic growth evaporate and become unreal. Growth fuelled by excess credit leads inevitably, as night follows day, to ballooning bubbles, burst by devastating crashes on financial markets. Fresh and well formulated supply-focused economic policies would need to take due account of such undesirable and destabilising implications. This concern points to a new role for central bankers, implying, by osmosis, a fresh style of monetary policy being needed as well. Inflation targeting (keeping core inflation around 2%), the sacred cow for central banks since the early 1980s, is no longer appropriate for either today’s growth conditions or for an innovative, supply-geared economic policy mix.
Imagination will be required to forge this new role for central banks. Not to mention the bravery in calling into question the orthodoxy that has held sway for so long. In the past though, periods when there have been serious ruptures in cyclical economic patterns have often seen major shifts and key policy breakthroughs. However, all the courage and boldness will be futile if the will to bounce back is lacking. The challenge is most daunting. The direction of economic policies over the next few years will dictate the structural trends for developed economies for decades to come. We just have to hope that policymakers will dig deep amid all the grave economic, political and social crises today to find that courage to be bold and innovative.
Friday, June 22, 2012
Nobody really understands debt
By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: January 1, 2012
In 2011, as in 2010, America was in a technical recovery but continued to suffer from disastrously high unemployment. And through most of 2011, as in 2010, almost all the conversation in Washington was about something else: the allegedly urgent issue of reducing the budget deficit.
Wednesday, July 29, 2009
Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds
By Charles Duhigg (New York Times)
It is the hot new thing on Wall Street, a way for a handful of traders to master the stock market, peek at investors’ orders and, critics say, even subtly manipulate share prices.
It is called high-frequency trading — and it is suddenly one of the most talked-about and mysterious forces in the markets.
Powerful computers, some housed right next to the machines that drive marketplaces like the New York Stock Exchange, enable high-frequency traders to transmit millions of orders at lightning speed and, their detractors contend, reap billions at everyone else’s expense.
These systems are so fast they can outsmart or outrun other investors, humans and computers alike. And after growing in the shadows for years, they are generating lots of talk.
Nearly everyone on Wall Street is wondering how hedge funds and large banks like Goldman Sachs are making so much money so soon after the financial system nearly collapsed. High-frequency trading is one answer.
And when a former Goldman Sachs programmer was accused this month of stealing secret computer codes — software that a federal prosecutor said could “manipulate markets in unfair ways” — it only added to the mystery. Goldman acknowledges that it profits from high-frequency trading, but disputes that it has an unfair advantage.
Yet high-frequency specialists clearly have an edge over typical traders, let alone ordinary investors. The Securities and Exchange Commission says it is examining certain aspects of the strategy.
“This is where all the money is getting made,” said William H. Donaldson, former chairman and chief executive of the New York Stock Exchange and today an adviser to a big hedge fund. “If an individual investor doesn’t have the means to keep up, they’re at a huge disadvantage.”
For most of Wall Street’s history, stock trading was fairly straightforward: buyers and sellers gathered on exchange floors and dickered until they struck a deal. Then, in 1998, the Securities and Exchange Commission authorized electronic exchanges to compete with marketplaces like the New York Stock Exchange. The intent was to open markets to anyone with a desktop computer and a fresh idea.
But as new marketplaces have emerged, PCs have been unable to compete with Wall Street’s computers. Powerful algorithms — “algos,” in industry parlance — execute millions of orders a second and scan dozens of public and private marketplaces simultaneously. They can spot trends before other investors can blink, changing orders and strategies within milliseconds.
High-frequency traders often confound other investors by issuing and then canceling orders almost simultaneously. Loopholes in market rules give high-speed investors an early glance at how others are trading. And their computers can essentially bully slower investors into giving up profits — and then disappear before anyone even knows they were there.
High-frequency traders also benefit from competition among the various exchanges, which pay small fees that are often collected by the biggest and most active traders — typically a quarter of a cent per share to whoever arrives first. Those small payments, spread over millions of shares, help high-speed investors profit simply by trading enormous numbers of shares, even if they buy or sell at a modest loss.
“It’s become a technological arms race, and what separates winners and losers is how fast they can move,” said Joseph M. Mecane of NYSE Euronext, which operates the New York Stock Exchange. “Markets need liquidity, and high-frequency traders provide opportunities for other investors to buy and sell.”
The rise of high-frequency trading helps explain why activity on the nation’s stock exchanges has exploded. Average daily volume has soared by 164 percent since 2005, according to data from NYSE. Although precise figures are elusive, stock exchanges say that a handful of high-frequency traders now account for a more than half of all trades. To understand this high-speed world, consider what happened when slow-moving traders went up against high-frequency robots earlier this month, and ended up handing spoils to lightning-fast computers.
It was July 15, and Intel, the computer chip giant, had reporting robust earnings the night before. Some investors, smelling opportunity, set out to buy shares in the semiconductor company Broadcom. (Their activities were described by an investor at a major Wall Street firm who spoke on the condition of anonymity to protect his job.) The slower traders faced a quandary: If they sought to buy a large number of shares at once, they would tip their hand and risk driving up Broadcom’s price. So, as is often the case on Wall Street, they divided their orders into dozens of small batches, hoping to cover their tracks. One second after the market opened, shares of Broadcom started changing hands at $26.20.
The slower traders began issuing buy orders. But rather than being shown to all potential sellers at the same time, some of those orders were most likely routed to a collection of high-frequency traders for just 30 milliseconds — 0.03 seconds — in what are known as flash orders. While markets are supposed to ensure transparency by showing orders to everyone simultaneously, a loophole in regulations allows marketplaces like Nasdaq to show traders some orders ahead of everyone else in exchange for a fee.
In less than half a second, high-frequency traders gained a valuable insight: the hunger for Broadcom was growing. Their computers began buying up Broadcom shares and then reselling them to the slower investors at higher prices. The overall price of Broadcom began to rise.
Soon, thousands of orders began flooding the markets as high-frequency software went into high gear. Automatic programs began issuing and canceling tiny orders within milliseconds to determine how much the slower traders were willing to pay. The high-frequency computers quickly determined that some investors’ upper limit was $26.40. The price shot to $26.39, and high-frequency programs began offering to sell hundreds of thousands of shares.
The result is that the slower-moving investors paid $1.4 million for about 56,000 shares, or $7,800 more than if they had been able to move as quickly as the high-frequency traders.
Multiply such trades across thousands of stocks a day, and the profits are substantial. High-frequency traders generated about $21 billion in profits last year, the Tabb Group, a research firm, estimates.
“You want to encourage innovation, and you want to reward companies that have invested in technology and ideas that make the markets more efficient,” said Andrew M. Brooks, head of United States equity trading at T. Rowe Price, a mutual fund and investment company that often competes with and uses high-frequency techniques. “But we’re moving toward a two-tiered marketplace of the high-frequency arbitrage guys, and everyone else. People want to know they have a legitimate shot at getting a fair deal. Otherwise, the markets lose their integrity.”